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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 14-4538 
______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
 
v. 
 
DAVID CUNNINGHAM, 
   Appellant 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. No. 2-07-cr-00298-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Cathy Bissoon 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 26, 2016 
______________ 
 
Before: JORDAN, VANASKIE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges.  
 
(Filed: February 10, 2016) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
                                              
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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 Appellant David Cunningham was twice convicted of receipt, possession, and 
distribution of child pornography.  His original conviction was vacated because of 
evidentiary errors.  See United States v. Cunningham, 694 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(Cunningham I).  On remand, the case was assigned to a different District Judge.  A 
second jury found Cunningham guilty on all counts, and the District Court sentenced 
Cunningham to 240 months’ imprisonment.1  Cunningham appeals, challenging the 
District Court’s denial of his motion to preclude evidence of a prior conviction for 
indecent exposure to a minor under the age of sixteen and its imposition of a higher 
sentence than he originally received.  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm. 
I 
 In 2007, law enforcement learned that a computer located in Cunningham’s 
residence downloaded and shared files that bore indicia of child pornography.  
Cunningham I, 694 F.3d at 376.  Law enforcement obtained a warrant to search the 
Pennsylvania residence Cunningham shared with his siblings, Sarah and Harold 
Cunningham.2  Id. at 375-76.  Only Sarah and Harold were home when the agents 
executed the warrant; Sarah directed the agents to Cunningham’s bedroom because he 
had the only “working computer” in the residence.  App. 276.  A search of the bedroom 
                                              
 1 The District Court granted the Government’s motion to vacate and dismiss Count 
Two (possession) in light of United States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 72 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(convictions for receipt and possession of child pornography punish the same offense, in 
violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause).   
 2 As did the Court in Cunningham I, for simplicity, we will refer to Cunningham’s 
relatives by their first names. 
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produced the computer, mail and paperwork addressed to Cunningham, Marlboro 
cigarettes, and a thumb drive that contained photographs of Cunningham with snakes.3   
 During the search, Cunningham returned to the residence, admitted to installing a 
file sharing program on his computer, and to using search terms like “kiddy” and “child,” 
to find and download child pornography files through that program.  App. 194.  When an 
investigator showed Cunningham the names of files found on his computer, Cunningham 
acknowledged that the files were from his shared drive, and he estimated that twenty to 
thirty percent of the videos on his computer contained child pornography.  Subsequent 
forensic analysis revealed, among other things, that fifty-seven complete or partially 
downloaded videos contained child pornography, and showed a history of search terms 
that referenced child pornography.  Forensic analysis also revealed that the Yahoo email 
account, “Reptilewild2005@yahoo.com,” App. 246, was accessed from the computer 
around the same time that child pornography videos were downloaded.  Law enforcement 
officers testified that Cunningham told them “Reptilewild2005@yahoo.com” was his 
email address, and Sarah testified that Cunningham had an interest in reptiles and used an 
email address that referenced them.   
 Law enforcement obtained an arrest warrant and an officer told Cunningham that 
they needed to meet.  Cunningham was not at home when officers arrived, and they 
“spent several hours trying to locate” him.  App. 64.  They eventually found Cunningham 
hiding in or near a tree near an abandoned house.   
                                              
 3 Cunningham was the only member of his residence who smoked, and Sarah 
testified that Marlboro was Cunningham’s brand of choice.   
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 Cunningham was charged in a three-count indictment with receipt, possession, and 
distribution of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(2) (receipt and 
distribution), (a)(4)(B) (possession).  Cunningham I, 694 F.3d at 375, 382.  Following a 
jury trial, Cunningham was convicted and sentenced to 210 months’ imprisonment and 
twenty years’ supervised release.  Cunningham appealed his conviction.  This Court 
vacated his conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding that the District Court: (1) 
abused its discretion in refusing to view video excerpts of the child pornography 
Cunningham had downloaded before ruling on their admissibility, and (2) erred under 
Fed. R. Evid. 403 by admitting two of the clips because their “highly inflammatory 
nature . . . clearly and substantially outweighed their probative value pertaining to the 
crimes charged.”  Id. at 375.   
 On remand, the case was assigned to Judge Cathy Bissoon.  As he had before the 
first trial, Cunningham filed a motion to exclude evidence of his prior state court 
conviction for indecent exposure involving a young child, in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 3127(a) (1967), pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 403 and 404.4  Cunningham argued that 
his prior conviction could not be offered for any of Rule 404(b)’s non-propensity 
purposes, and that even if it could, its probative value was substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice.  The Government offered several non-propensity 
purposes, including identity, motive, intent, and absence of mistake or accident, to rebut 
Cunningham’s theory that another member of his household had accessed his computer 
                                              
 4 Cunningham also moved to exclude the evidence under Fed R. Evid. 609.  
Because Cunningham did not testify at trial, the conviction was not offered to impeach 
him, and we need not address his Rule 609 argument. 
5 
 
and downloaded child pornography.  The District Court denied Cunningham’s motion 
and overruled his objection at trial when the Government introduced the conviction.   
 The Government presented the evidence described above at both trials.  Like the 
first jury, the second jury convicted Cunningham on all counts.5  At the sentencing 
hearing, the District Court found that Cunningham’s total offense level was 35 and his 
criminal history category was III, resulting in a Guidelines range of 210 to 262 months.  
Cunningham argued, among other things, that under North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 
711 (1969), the District Court should impose a sentence no greater than the 210-month 
term originally imposed.6  The District Court rejected Cunningham’s argument on the 
ground that it would make an “individualized” sentencing determination, App. 541, and, 
even if Cunningham received a higher sentence, the rebuttable presumption of judicial 
vindictiveness when a defendant receives a higher sentence upon resentencing does not 
apply here, because “different sentencing judges [would] assess the varying sentences in 
question.”  App. 573.  
 The District Court examined the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and 
imposed a sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment on each of Counts I and III, to be 
served concurrently.7  The District Court explained that Cunningham’s activity was 
dangerous and caused “devastating harm” to the victims of child pornography, and that 
                                              
 5 As discussed supra note 1, the District Court granted the Government’s motion to 
vacate and dismiss Count Two (possession).   
 6 Cunningham also objected to the Pre-Sentence Report’s (“PSR”) two-level 
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(6) for use of a computer.  The District Court 
sustained this objection.  This ruling was not appealed. 
 7 The statutory maximum for each count of conviction was 240 months.  18 U.S.C. 
§ 2252(b)(1). 
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the goals of “just punishment, public protection and deterrence, and rehabilitation” were 
served by the sentence.  App. 571.  The District Court also observed that Cunningham did 
more than view images online; he had previously “act[ed] on his deviant impulse,” and 
showed a “disturbing pattern,” by engaging in the conduct of conviction while on 
probation for indecent exposure involving a four-year-old victim, and after participating 
in court-ordered sex offender treatment.  App. 571-72.  Finally, the District Court 
explained that Cunningham showed no remorse or acceptance of responsibility when he 
denied having a sexual interest in children or child pornography.  App. 572 (“Having now 
been twice convicted of crimes involving inappropriate sexual interest in children, it 
suffices to say that Mr. Cunningham’s actions speak louder than words.”).  The District 
Court acknowledged that some judges have accepted policy arguments about the 
Guidelines’ treatment of child pornography offenses and granted downward variances 
accordingly, but stated that 240 months most appropriately balanced the § 3553(a) factors 
in Cunningham’s case.   
  Cunningham appeals: (1) the denial of his motion to exclude his prior conviction 
for misdemeanor indecent exposure, and (2) the denial of his request that his sentence be 
no greater than the sentence imposed after his first trial. 
II8 
                                              
 8 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  “We review a district 
court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of discretion,” Marra v. Phila. 
Hous. Auth., 497 F.3d 286, 297 (3d Cir. 2007), but we exercise “plenary review ‘of 
whether evidence falls within the scope of Rule 404(b).’”  United States v. Green, 617 
F.3d 233, 239 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Cruz, 326 F.3d 392, 394 (3d Cir. 
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A 
 We first address whether Cunningham’s prior conviction was properly admitted 
under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).  Rule 404(b) provides: “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or 
other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a 
particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.”  Fed. R. Evid. 
404(b)(1).  However, such evidence may be admissible for a proper purpose “such as 
proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of 
mistake, or lack of accident.”  Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2).  We need not decide whether the 
District Court erred in admitting Cunningham’s indecent exposure conviction, however, 
because even if the District Court erred, any such error was harmless given the strength 
of the case against Cunningham.   
 An error is harmless if it is “highly probable that [any] error did not contribute to 
the judgment.”  United States v. Berrios, 676 F.3d 118, 131 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); Cunningham I, 694 F.3d at 392 (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (“This high probability requires that the court possess a sure conviction that the 
error did not prejudice the defendant.”).  Here, the overwhelming evidence of 
Cunningham’s guilt makes us sure that any error did not prejudice him. 
 Three law enforcement officers testified that Cunningham admitted to owning the 
computer on which the child pornography files were found, to using search terms related 
to child pornography on the internet, and to downloading and viewing such files.  In 
                                                                                                                                                  
2003)).  We also review sentencing determinations for abuse of discretion.  Gall v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 570 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
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addition, forensic evidence linked Cunningham’s “Reptilewild2005@yahoo.com” email 
address and internet usage with the searches and downloads of child pornography.  For 
example, a detailed breakdown of the activity on the computer indicated that, on one 
occasion, a computer user accessed Cunningham’s email account shortly before one of 
the videos containing child pornography was downloaded.  The Government also 
presented evidence, in addition to Cunningham’s own statements, that he controlled the 
room where the computer was found and kept personal possessions there.  Specifically, a 
law enforcement witness testified that, near the computer, there were workmen’s 
compensation documents and “court documents with [Cunningham’s] name and address 
that w[ere] dated in close proximity to the date” of the execution of the search warrant.  
App. 185.  The officer found no paperwork in the room that would indicated that anyone 
else stayed or lived in that room.  Also next to the computer was a thumb drive 
containing “many pictures” of Cunningham holding snakes, which both tied him to the 
computer (given the drive’s proximity to it) and the email address (given the contents of 
the photographs).  App. 189.  Cunningham’s sister testified that he lived in that room and 
was the only one who used the computer.  Finally, when law enforcement arranged to 
meet with him after the seizure of his computer, Cunningham fled and hid for hours in a 
tree near a vacant home, indicative of his consciousness of guilt.  In sum, the Government 
presented evidence that “was so overwhelming that any improper inferences the jury 
might have drawn from the [conviction] were marginal, at most.”9  Berrios, 676 F.3d at 
131. 
                                              
 9 As to the admission of Cunningham’s prior conviction, we note that the 
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 Based on this evidence, we have a “sure conviction” that even without the 
evidence of Cunningham’s prior conviction, the jury would have concluded beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Cunningham was the member of the household who received, 
possessed, and distributed child pornography.  See United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 
512, 539-40 (3d Cir. 2010) (any error in admitting record about child pornography 
victim’s date of birth was harmless because there was no question that the naked females 
depicted in the images shown at trial were minors).  Thus, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order denying Cunningham’s motion to exclude his prior conviction. 
B 
 We now address Cunningham’s claim that the imposition of a sentence higher than 
the one imposed after his first trial was presumptively vindictive and thereby violated due 
process.  “Due process of law . . . requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for 
having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he 
receives after a new trial.”  North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969).  Under 
Pearce and its progeny, a rebuttable presumption of vindictiveness may apply when a 
defendant receives a more severe sentence after having exercised his due process rights to 
                                                                                                                                                  
Government made no reference to the conviction in either its opening statement or 
closing argument—the conviction was admitted through one law enforcement witness 
with no reference to the factual allegations that formed the basis of that conviction.  In 
addition, the witness made no reference to the fact that the alleged victim in that case was 
four years old; he testified only that the nature of the crime of conviction “indicate[d that] 
the child victim was under the age of 16.”  App. 308.  Immediately after that testimony, 
the District Court provided a limiting instruction to the jury, admonishing them to 
consider the evidence only for a proper purpose and not “as proof [that Cunningham] has 
a bad character or any propensity to commit crimes.”  App. 309.  This limiting instruction 
was also given at the end of the trial.  We generally presume “that juries follow the 
instructions they are given.”  Adamson v. Cathel, 633 F.3d 248, 257 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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appeal, see United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 374 (1982), but it “do[es] not apply 
in every case where a convicted defendant receives a higher sentence on retrial.”  Texas 
v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 138 (1986).   
 For example, the presumption “does not apply where the second sentence is 
imposed by a different sentencer and the record provides affirmative assurance that the 
harsher sentence reflects simply a fresh look at the facts and an independent exercise of 
discretion.”  Rock v. Zimmerman, 959 F.2d 1237, 1257 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc), 
abrogated on other grounds by Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993); see also 
United States v. Moskovits, 86 F.3d 1303, 1310 (3d Cir. 1996) (rejecting claim of 
appellant who argued actual, not presumptive vindictiveness, in part because the second 
sentencing judge “had no contact whatsoever with [appellant’s] initial trial and set out, on 
the record, plausible reasons for the harsher sentence he imposed”).  Accordingly, “where 
a judge who imposes the second sentence has no material contact with the initial trial or 
sentence and provides an on-the-record, wholly logical, non-vindictive reason for the 
harsher sentence, it is not necessary for him or her to invoke facts not available at the 
time of the first sentence.”  Rock, 959 F.2d at 1257-58 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  In such a case, an appellant must provide “proof of actual vindictiveness” by 
the second sentencing judge to support a claim of judicial vindictiveness.  Id. at 1258.  
Absent such proof, an appellant’s claim fails.  See Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 799-
800 (1989). 
 Here, the Pearce presumption does not apply.  Following remand, Cunningham’s 
case was reassigned to Judge Bissoon and there is no evidence, nor does Cunningham 
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allege, that she was involved with the first trial or sentencing.  Moreover, Judge Bissoon 
explained that she would exercise independent judgment about the sentence based on her 
view of the facts.  Further, Judge Bissoon provided ample justification for her sentencing 
decision, including the need for just punishment, public protection, deterrence, and her 
view that Cunningham lacked remorse and did not accept responsibility.  This “record 
provides affirmative assurance that the harsher sentence reflects simply a fresh look at the 
facts and an independent exercise of discretion.”  Rock, 959 F.2d at 1257.10  That the 
parties presented substantially the same evidence at both trials does not limit the new 
judge’s independent exercise of sentencing authority to impose a greater sentence than 
that imposed at the first sentencing.11  For these reasons, Cunningham has not shown that 
the Pearce presumption applies, nor has he or could he argue that Judge Bissoon was 
“actual[ly] vindictive[ ].”  Id. at 1258. 
 Indeed, the sentence Judge Bissoon imposed was procedurally and substantively 
reasonable.  Judge Bissoon calculated the advisory sentencing Guidelines, considered the 
§ 3553(a) factors, selected a sentence based on the facts before the District Court, and 
                                              
 10 Cunningham also suggests that the District Court failed to “affirmatively” 
explain the reasons for imposing the 240-month sentence, Appellant’s Br. 17-18, which 
we understand to refer to the absence of a specific explanation why the second judge 
concluded her sentence was more appropriate than the first sentence imposed.  This 
challenge fails.  A second sentencer need not expressly compare her sentencing decision 
to a prior decision so long as the second sentencer provides reasons for the sentence 
imposed. 
 11 Cunningham focuses on the fact that no new evidence was adduced at the 
second trial, and argues that “the appearance of vindictiveness by the court remains” 
because “a colleague from the same court presided over the second trial.”  Appellant’s 
Br. 16-19 (emphasis omitted).  The Pearce line of cases does not address the appearance 
of vindictiveness by the court writ large, and we discern no such vindictiveness here. 
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explained the chosen sentence.  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 
2009) (en banc).  In this regard, Judge Bissoon explained the dangerous and harmful 
nature of Cunningham’s offenses and that the goals of “just punishment, public 
protection and deterrence, and rehabilitation” were served by the sentence, particularly in 
light of Cunningham’s previous conviction for indecent exposure involving a four-year-
old victim.  App. 571.  Judge Bissoon also noted that Cunningham engaged in the 
conduct charged in this case while on probation for the previous conviction, after 
participating in court-ordered sex offender treatment, and that he showed a lack of 
remorse and did not accept responsibility for his actions.  Thus, the record shows a 
“rational and meaningful consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a).”  United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc).   
 The sentence was also substantively reasonable.  The sentence imposed is not one 
we can say that “no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed . . . on that 
particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.”  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568.  
Although Judge Bissoon imposed a higher sentence than the prior judge, the sentence was 
supported by the record and her comprehensive reasons.   
 Because the Pearce presumption does not apply, Cunningham does not argue 
actual vindictiveness, and the 240-month sentence imposed was procedurally and 
substantively reasonable, we will affirm his sentence. 
III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order denying 
Cunningham’s motion to preclude a prior conviction and its judgment of sentence. 
